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The interplay between the two most common sources of federal court
prisoner litigation, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the federal habeas corpus statute,
28 U.S. C. § 2254, has long been the source of vigorous judicial and aca-
demic discourse. This Note uses a recent Second Circuit decision, Jenkins v.
Haubert, to illustrate the lower federal courts' confusion over the proper
application of an important limit on prisoner litigation, the favorable-termi-
nation rule. The author asserts that the Jenkins court erroneously side-
stepped Supreme Court precedent, specifically, Heck v. Humphrey and its
progeny. Heck'sfavorable-temination rule requires a prisoner to show that
her conviction was reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question
by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before she may bring a
damages claim under § 1983 alleging unconstitutional conviction or im-
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prisonment. This Note argues that the Jenkins court read Heck and its
progeny too narrowly. Spedfically, it criticizes theJenkins court for refusing
to apply the favorable-tennination rule to former prisoners and to challenges
to disciplinary segregation that have no effect on the overall length of
confinement.
This Note concludes that until the Supreme Court provides a more
clearly defined rule, the lower courts slwuld read Heck and its progeny as
standingfor the general proposition that in order to recover under a § 1983
claim alleging unconstitutional conviction, sentence, or intraprison confine-
ment, a plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of the favorable-termination
rule.
INTRODUCrION
In 1997, prisoners filed just under 65,000 petitions in the United
States district courts, a twenty-two and one-half percent increase over
the number filed just four years earlier.' Those 65,000 prisoner peti-
tions accounted for almost twenty-five percent of the entire civil
caseload in federal district courts.2 The two most "fertile sources"3 of
these petitions are 42 U.S.C. § 19834 and the federal habeas corpus
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254,5 both of which provide remedies for ag-
1 See ADMiN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CxsELo.%: A FhvE-YkRt
RETRosPEcrvE 14 (1997), available at http://xw.wwuscourts.gov/publications.htm.
2 See .
3 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994).
4 Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, priii-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laus, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Professor Martin Schx-artz and Judge George Pratt have noted
that "[s]ection 1983 is a vital part of American law." Martin A. Schartz & Hon. George C.
Pratt, Section 1983 Litigation, 14 TouRo L R v. 299, 299 (1998).
5 Section 2254 provides in pertinent part:
(a) [A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to thejudgment of a State
court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted un-
less it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies amilable in
the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of amnilable State
corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process
ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies anil-
able in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if lie has
the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994).
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grieved prisoners. At the intersection of these two statutes, confusion
abounds.
In Heck v. Humphrey,6 the Supreme Court held that a prisoner
may not bring a damages action under § 1983 alleging unconstitu-
tional conviction or imprisonment unless the conviction has been re-
versed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.7 This rule prevents prison-
ers from evading the habeas statute's strict exhaustion requirements
by labeling the action one arising under § 1983.8 At the time, the
"Heck rule" seemed a "relatively simple way to avoid collisions at the
intersection of habeas and § 1983." 9 However, the rule has proven to
be anything but simple.
Three years later, Edwards v. Balisok'0 extended the Heck rationale
to suits attacking intraprison disciplinary sanctions that affect the
overall length of confinement." Unfortunately, Edwards raised as
many questions as it answered and caused an abundance of confusion
in the lower courts.12 Does the Heck-Edwards rule apply to sanctions
that do not affect the overall length of confinement? Does it apply to
former prisoners, for whom habeas corpus relief is not available?'3
In June of 1999, the Second Circuit handed down Jenkins v.
Haubert,14 holding that Heck and its progeny do not bar such suits.15
The Jenkins court resolved a split amongst its own district courts, but a
split amongst the circuit courts continues. 16 This Note uses theJenkins
opinion as an illustration of the lower courts' confusion as to how to
resolve this important issue. Moreover, this Note argues that the Sec-
ond Circuit now joins those sister circuits that have erroneously side-
6 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
7 See id. at 486-87.
8 See infra Part I.B.
9 Heck, 512 U.S. at 498 (Souter, J., concurring).
10 520 U.S. 641 (1997).
11 See infra Part I.C.
12 See infra Part II; see also Bradley v. Evans, No. 98-5861, 2000 "WL 1277229, at *5 (6th
Cir. Aug. 23, 2000) (table opinion, full text available on Westlaw) ("This area of the law ...
remains in a state of flux." (citation omitted)).
is According to Professor Schwartz and Judge Pratt, these questions are "certainly
among the most important issues regarding Section 1983." Schwartz & Pratt, supra note 4,
at 299.
14 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999).
15 See infra Part III.B.
16 See Melissa L. Koehn, The New American Caste System: The Supreme Court and Discrimi-
nation Among Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 32 U. MIcn. JL. RrEoP.M 49, 91 (1998) ("As is readily
obvious, Heck did not clarify [§ 1983 litigation]."); Martin A. Schwartz, Supreme Court Section
1983 Developments, 15 TouRo L. Rxv. 1483, 1488 (1999) (noting that "Heck has generated
all kinds of problems"); Eric J. Savoy, Comment, Heck v. Humphrey: What Should State
Prisoners Use When Seeking Damages from State Officals ...Section 1983 or Federal Habeas
Corpus?, 22 Nmv ENG.J. ON GRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 109, 110 (1996) (claiming that the
Heck decision "makes an already difficult area of [the] law even more complex").
[Vol. 86:140
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stepped the requirements of Heck and its progeny. While the result is
superficially appealing, Jenkins is an inaccurate reading of Supreme
Court precedent.
Part I chronicles the development of applicable Supreme Court
precedent, beginning with Heck and proceeding to Edwards v. Balisoh 7
and Spencer v. Kemna.18 Part II describes the lower courts' confusion
regarding the application of this precedent and reveals the sharp di-
vide over the reach of Heck and its progeny. Part Ill discusses the
Jenkins decision itself, and Part IV argues that the Jenkins court errone-
ously held Heck's favorable-termination rule inapplicable to a former
prisoner who had challenged the procedures afforded to him in a dis-
ciplinary hearing that resulted in a period of solitary confinement.
Part IV also argues that the court failed to adequately tackle Jenkins's
two analytically distinct due process claims and suggests a better
approach.
I
THE DEVFopMENT OF THE FAVORABLE-TERMINATION
REQUIEMMENT
A. Section 1983 and the Habeas Statute: A Brief History
In order to properly examine the difficulties surrounding Heck
and its progeny, it is first necessary to briefly discuss two important
federal statutes: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254.19
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, a Reconstruction Era statute com-
monly referred to as the Ku Klux Klan Act, was a "crucial ingredient[ ]
in the basic alteration of our federal system."20 Section 1983 derives
from section 1 of the 1871 Act2' and provides a remedy for individuals
harmed by unconstitutional action taken under color of state law.-
The purpose of § 1983 was to "interpose the federal courts between
the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal
rights,"23 especially when state courts were unable or unvilling to en-
17 520 U.S. 641 (1997).
18 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
19 For additional discussion of the interplay between § 1983 and the habeas statute,
see RicHARD H. FALLON Ex AL, HART Am WacHsLra's THE FEDE.RAL CouRTS AND THE FED.
ERA. Sysrme 1513-15 (4th ed. 1996); PEm W. Low & JoHN C. JEFms, JR., FEDRAL
CouRTs AND TBE LiW OF FEDERAL-STATE REL.ONs 1134-67 (4th ed. 1998); Martin A.
Schwartz, The Preiser Puzle: Continued Frustrating Confli Betawen the Civil Rights and Haleas
Corpus Remedies for State Pnsonen 37 DEPAUL L REV. 85, 88-111 (1988).
20 Patsy v. Fa. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982).
21 See CHARLus ALAN WIGHT, Lw OF FEDERAL CouRTs 133-34 (5th ed. 1994).
22 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
23 Id. (citations omitted); see also WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 137 ("The basic purpose of
... § 1983 is to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional
rights.").
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force those rights.2 4 Congress intended to "'throw open the doors of
the United States courts to individuals who... suffered... the depri-
vation of constitutional rights." 25
While Congress clearly intended the Civil Rights Act to provide a
federal forum for redressing constitutional violations, Congress did
not fashion the federal remedy to displace the availability of state
courts to hear similar claims.26 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that, in order to bring an action under § 1983, it is
unnecessary for an individual to exhaust state remedies.2 7
However, exhaustion of state remedies is a necessary prerequisite
to seeking relief under the relevant federal habeas corpus statute,
§ 2254.28 The "essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in
custody upon the legality of that custody, and.., the traditional func-
tion of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody."29 Habeas
corpus is "of immemorial antiquity"30 and is often referred to as the
"Great Writ."3 1
Since both § 1983 and the habeas statute address constitutional
violations, the two often overlap. However, as Professor Schwartz
notes, "[t] his hardly means that they are fungible."3 2 Indeed, because
habeas requires exhaustion, while § 1983 does not, the intersection of
the two statutes has yielded a great deal of litigation." As noted by
Justice Souter, the "general" civil rights statute and the "specific"
habeas corpus statute not only have the potential to overlap and inter-
sect, but they are on a direct "collision course."3 4
24 See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 89 ("The Congress that adopted the 1871 Act de-
cided that a federal remedy for constitutional deprivations was necessary because state au-
thorities were either unwilling or unable to control the widespread violence of the Ku Klux
Klan against blacks and their supporters.").
25 Patsy, 457 U.S. at 504 (quoting remarks of Rep. Lowe).
26 See Patsy, 457 U.S. at 506 (noting that "many legislators interpreted [section 1 of the
1871 Act] to provide dual or concurrent forums in the state and federal system, enabling
the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to seek relief"); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
183 (1961), ovemded by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) ("The federal
remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and
refused before the federal one is invoked.").
27 See, e.g., Patsy, 457 U.S. at 506; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494-96 (1973).
28 See supra note 5. The statute provides that a writ of habeas corpus "shall not be
granted" unless the "applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
29 Preiser, 411 U.S. at 484.
30 WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 350.
31 Id. at 351.
32 Schwartz, supra note 19, at 98.
33 See supra note 19.
34 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 492 (1994) (SouterJ., concurring in judgment).
[V"ol. 86:140
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B. Heck v. Humphrey
The issue presented in Heck v. Humphrey was "whether a state pris-
oner may challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983" 9 without first obtaining a writ of
habeas corpus.
An Indiana state court convicted the petitioner, Roy Heck, of vol-
untary manslaughter and sentenced him to fifteen years in state
prison.36 While still incarcerated, Heck filed a § 1983 suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
claiming that county prosecutors and investigators had, among other
things, "engaged in an 'unlawfil, unreasonable, and arbitrary investi-
gation' leading to [Heck's] arrest; 'knowingly destroyed' evidence
'which was exculpatory in nature and could have proved [Heck's] in-
nocence'; and caused 'an illegal and unlawful voice identification pro-
cedure' to be used at [his] trial. " He sought compensatory and
punitive damages.3
Justice Scalia first noted that the case "lies at the intersection of
the two most fertile sources of federal-court prisoner litigation-the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 ... and the federal habeas corpus statute."39
He then began the majority's analysis by discussing Preiser v. Rodri-
gue4 4° in which state prisoners lost good-time credits as the result of
disciplinary hearings. 41 The Preiser plaintiffs sought an injunction re-
storing their good-time credits, relief that would have ended their
sentences immediately.42
The Preiser Court held that "habeas corpus is the exclusive rem-
edy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his
confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though
such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983." 43 In dicta,
the Preiser Court also suggested that a prisoner seeking only damages
and not immediate release, and thereby not attacking the fact or
length of confinement, may properly bring a § 1983 suit.44 However,
other dicta noted the possibility of situations in which § 1983 damage
suits essentially attack the conviction's validity, and thus habeas consti-
35 Heck, 512 U.S. at 478. Professor Schwartz and Judge Pratt %iew the case as "an
exceedingly important decision." Schwartz & Pratt, supra note 4, at 323.
36 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 478.
37 I. at 479.
38 Se id.
39 Id. at 480.
40 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
41 See id. at 476. Good-time credit is "awarded for good conduct and reduces [the]
period of sentence which [a] prisoner must spend in prison." BLAcK's LAw DziCo ,w
694 (6th ed. 1990).
42 See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 476-77.
43 HedA 512 U.S. at 481.
44 See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489.
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tutes the appropriate vehicle for relief, overriding the "general terms
of § 1983." 45
The Heck majority found it unnecessary to apply the muddled rea-
soning4 6 of the Preiser dicta47 and interpreted Preises narrow holding
as applying only to prisoners seeking release from custody.48 Since
Heck asked only for monetary damages, the Court analogized his
§ 1983 suit to a suit alleging malicious prosecution. Noting that
§ 1983 "creates a species of tort liability,"49 Justice Scalia explored the
common law tort principle that a civil suit is an improper vehicle to
mount a collateral attack on an outstanding criminal conviction.5 0
In order to bring a successful suit for malicious prosecution, the
accused must first obtain a favorable judgment in the criminal prose-
cution.51 The Court explained that this requirement "'avoids parallel
litigation over the issues of probable cause and guilt.' 5 2 Without this
rule, a claimant would be able to succeed in a tort action while the
underlying criminal conviction still stands. The possibility of that situ-
ation contravenes "'strong judicial policy against the creation of two
conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transac-
tion.' ' 53 Permitting parallel litigation would effectively allow a con-
victed criminal to bring a collateral attack in the form of a civil suit. 4
Extending the analogy of malicious prosecution, the Court con-
cluded that "the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appro-
priate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal
judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require
the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confine-
ment."55 The Court then announced its governing rule:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitu-
tional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by ac-
45 Id. at 490.
46 Justice Scalia characterized the dicta of Preiser as "unreliable, if not... unintel-
ligible." Heck, 512 U.S. at 482.
47 Professor Schwartz notes that the ambiguous Preiser decision resulted in frustrating
attempts of lower courts to solve "Preiser Puzzles." Schwartz, supra note 19, at 87-88.
48 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 483 ("Thus, the question posed by § 1983 damages claims that
do call into question the lawfulness of conviction or confinement remains open.").
49 Heck, 512 U.S. at 483 (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,
305 (1986)). According to Professor Beermann, the Court's characterization of § 1983 as
creating a "'species of tort liability'" is a "familiar adage." Jack M. Beermann, Common Law
Elements of the Section 1983 Action, 72 CHi.-KNrT L. REv. 695, 712 (1997) (quoting Hech, 512
U.S. at 483 (quoting, respectively, Stachura, 477 U.S. at 305)).
50 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 483-87.
51 See W. PAGE &ETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THEA LAW OF TORTS § 119, at
874 (5th ed. 1984).
52 Heck, 512 U.S. at 484 (quoting 8 S. SPEISER ET At., ArmIUCAN LAW OF TORTS § 28:5,
at 24 (1991)).
53 Id.
54 See id.
55 Id. at 486.
146 [Vol. 86:140
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tions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such deter-
mination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.56
Thus, the Court concluded that a district court judge hearing a pris-
oner's § 1983 suit must determine whether a successful claim would
necessarily imply the invalidity of the underlying conviction or
sentence.
5 7
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment but questioned Justice
Scalia's malicious prosecution analogy.5 8 Specifically, Justice Souter
asserted that relying on the majority's malicious prosecution analogy
would lead to the conclusion that a person convicted of a crime is
unable to bring a § 1983 damages claim, a position inconsistent with
"statutory interpretation."5 9 Rather than relying on the Court's rea-
soning, Justice Souter (with whom Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and
O'Connor joined) relied upon Preiser dicta, concluding that allowing
Heck to pursue his claim in federal court "'would wholly frustrate ex-
plicit congressional intent. '' 60 Injustice Souter's view, the Heck hold-
ing is limited to the proposition that a state prisoner may bring a
§ 1983 damages claim for unconstitutional confinement, but only if
he is able to show that a federal court has previously established the
invalidity of that confinement. 6' However, the concurring Justices re-
fused to read the majority's opinion so broadly as to bar individuals
for whom habeas is not available (those individuals not "in custody"6 2)
from bringing suit under § 1983 for unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment; to do so would "deny any federal forum for claiming a
deprivation of federal rights,"63 an assertedly "untoward result."64
In response to Justice Souter's concern for former prisoners who
are unable to bring postconviction challenges, the majority main-
tained that "the principle barring collateral attacks-a longstanding
and deeply rooted feature of both the common law and our ownjuris-
56 Id. at 486-87.
57 See id at 487.
58 See id. at 496 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
59 I. (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
60 Id. at 498 (SouterJ., concurring in judgment) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez. 411
U.S. 475, 489 (1973)).
61 See id. (SouterJ., concurring injudgment).
62 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Hed, 512 U.S. at 497 (SoutcrJ., concurring in judg-
ment) (discussing Praser and 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
63 Heck, 512 U.S. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
64 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
65 Regarding such individuals, Justice Scalia quipped: "of which no real-life e\ample
comes to mind." Id. at 490 n.10.
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prudence-is not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity that a con-
victed criminal is no longer incarcerated."66 It is not the federal
courts' province, Justice Scalia argued, to "provide a remedy for all
conceivable invasions of federal rights," 67 a result which would alter
the "entire landscape of our § 1983 jurisprudence." s
C. Edwards v. Balisok
Three years later, in Edwards v. Balisok,69 the Court once again
visited prisoner suits, extending the reach of Heck to intraprison ad-
ministrative sanctions. The question before the Court was whether a
state prisoner's damages claim, challenging the validity of intraprison
disciplinary procedures that resulted in a revocation of his good-time
credits, was cognizable under § 1983.70
The plaintiff in Edwards, Jerry Balisok, alleged that the proce-
dures used in his prison disciplinary hearings were inadequate. The
district court ruled that ajudgment in Balisok's favor would "'necessa-
rily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary hearing and the resulting
sanctions,' ' 71 and thus his § 1983 suit was not cognizable under
Heck 72 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Balisok's suit did not
fall within the purview of Heck, because Balisok challenged only the
procedures used in the disciplinary hearing, not the good-time credit
deprivation itself.73
The unanimous Supreme Court, per Justice Scalia, recognized
that the Ninth Circuit was correct in distinguishing between a request
for damages for deprivation of good-time credits as a procedural mat-
ter and a request for damages for deprivation of those credits as a
substantive matter.74 The Court disagreed, however, that this distinc-
tion was dispositive and noted that the Ninth Circuit's position ig-
nored the distinct possibility that the nature of the procedural
challenge could necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary
judgment.75 Indeed, if Balisok established the deceit and bias of the
prison officials, he would be entitled to have his disciplinary convic-
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 520 U.S. 641 (1997). Professor Schwartz and Judge Pratt have suggested that Ed.
wards was "the Section 1983 sleeper of the year." Schwartz & Pratt, supra note 4, at 324.
70 See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 643.
71 Id. at 644.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 645 (noting that "[t]he distinction between these two sorts of claims Is
clearly established in our case law, as is the plaintiff's entitlement to recover at least nomi-
nal damages under § 1983 if he proves the former one without also proving the latter
one") (citing Cary v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978)).
75 See id.
[Vol. 86:140
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tion set aside.7 6 Thus, the Court concluded that Balisok's claim for
damages, based on procedural defects in the prison disciplinary hear-
ing, necessarily implied the invalidity of the punishment imposed and
was therefore not cognizable under § 1983.77
The majority also reemphasized that neither Hedc nor Edwards im-
posed an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983 and pointed out that
the plaintiff would not necessarily be able to proceed under § 1983
even if he had exhausted all of the available state remedies.78 Either
the intraprison disciplinary conviction has been overturned and the
claim may proceed under § 1983, or it has not been overturned, in
which case the claim "is not cognizable and should be dismissed." 79
Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate concurrence, in which Justices
Souter and Breyer joined. While Justice Ginsburg agreed that Bal-
isok's allegations of decision-maker bias and deceit were not cogniza-
ble under § 1983, she opined that his other procedural claims would
not necessarily imply the invalidity of his good-time credit deprivation
and were immediately cognizable under § 1983.80
D. Spencer v. Kemna
Spencer v. KemnaP exacerbated the confusion in the courts of ap-
peals over proper application of Heck and Edwards. The plaintiff in
Spencer filed a habeas corpus challenge to a hearing that resulted in
revocation of his parole. Spencer completed his prison term before
the case was finally disposed of, and the Court confronted the issue of
whether his petition was mooL8 2
Spencer contended that, even though he was no longer in cus-
tody, his habeas corpus petition could not be moot, since Heck and
Edwards required him to demonstrate the invalidity of his parole revo-
cation before proceeding under § 1983.83 In other words, Spencer
argued that since he was not allowed to bring his § 1983 suit until a
federal court issued a writ of habeas corpus, thereby overturning the
hearing, his habeas corpus petition could not be moot. Justice Scalia,
writing the plurality opinion, rebuffed Spencer's contention as a
"great non sequitur, unless one believes (as we do not) that a § 1983
action for damages must always and everyvhere be available."84 How-
ever, the plurality noted that if Spencer were to seek damages for in-
76 See i& at 647.
77 See id at 648.
78 See id. at 649.
79 Id.
80 See id. at 649-50 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
81 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
82 See i& at 3.
83 See id. at 17.
84 1&
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adequate hearing procedures and not for reaching the wrong result,
then so long as the alleged defects did not necessarily imply the inva-
lidity of the punishment, Heck's favorable-termination requirement
would not apply.85
Justice Souter wrote another concurring opinion, in which Jus-
tices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Disagreeing with the
plurality's reading of Heck, Justice Souter reiterated that the reach of
§ 1983 should not be limited at the expense of persons no longer in
custody.8 6 According to the concurring Justices, the "better view"8 7 is
that a former prisoner "may bring a § 1983 action establishing the
unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement without being
bound to satisfy a favorable-termination requirement that it would be
impossible as a matter of law for him to satisfy."s8 Thus, Justice Souter
concluded, Spencer was free to bring a § 1983 action, regardless of
the fact that his habeas petition was moot. Justice Souter again ex-
pressed disagreement with the Heck majority's conclusion that
favorable-termination is a necessary element of a § 1983 cause of ac-
tion, insisting instead that favorable-termination is a "'simple way to
avoid collisions at the intersection of habeas and § 1983.' "89
Justice Ginsburg, in a separate concurrence, noted her agree-
ment with Justice Souter,90 as did Justice Stevens in his dissenting
opinion.91 Thus, after Spencer, five Justices of the current Court have
voiced support for Justice Souter's reading of Heck and its progeny.92
II
THE LowER COURTS
A. The Courts of Appeals
The first court of appeals to directly address the question of
whether the Heck rule applies to a § 1983 challenge to disciplinary
segregation that does not affect the overall length of confinement was
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The plain-
tiff in Brown v. Plaut,93 Ernest Brown, filed a § 1983 suit alleging a
85 See id.
86 See id. at 20-21 (Souter, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 21 (Souter, J., concurring).
88 Id (Souter, J., concurring).
89 1d. at 20 (Souter, J., concurring).
90 See id. at 21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that she has "come to agree with
Justice Souter's reasoning").
91 Id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Given the Court's holding that [Spencer]
does not have a remedy under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, as Justice Souter
explains, that [Spencer] may bring an action under [ ] § 1983.").
92 See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1488 ("The interesting issue here is whether this is
going to be regarded as dicta or as a holding by the lower courts.").
93 131 F.3d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 939 (1998).
[Vol. 86:140
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denial of due process that led to ten months of administrative segrega-
tion.94 Judge Wald, writing for the panel, rejected the trial court's
argument that Preiser and its progeny barred Brown's suit.95
Brown's complaint alleged violations arising only out of his place-
ment in administrative segregation, and he did not allege loss of good-
time credits; thus, the panel held that Heck was inapplicable.96 Judge
Wald noted that the complaint "may not properly be analogized to a
suit for malicious prosecution," 97 because "the decision he is challeng-
ing bears little resemblance to a judicial proceeding."98
The Brown court nimbly evaded Edwards by narrowly reading the
Supreme Court's opinion as "careful to respect"99 the distinction be-
tween administrative sanctions that changed the overall length of con-
finement and those that changed only the "conditions of
confinement."100 Crucial to the panel's conclusion was Sandin v. Con-
net,1°1 in which the Supreme Court failed to question the plaintiff's
invocation of § 1983 but held that, in order to constitute a protected
liberty interest, an inmate's disciplinary confinement must constitute
an "atypical and significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life."10 2
Nonetheless, in Gambina v. Sawyer, 03 the D.C. Circuit later recog-
nized that, despite dicta in Brown suggesting otherwise, if the "proce-
dural defects alleged would, if established, necessarily imply the
invalidity of the punishment imposed,"10 4 then the § 1983 claim aris-
ing out of disciplinary sanctions is not cognizable under Edwards.105
In Figueroa v. Rivera,10 6 the First Circuit confronted a case in
which the plaintiff died before he was able to have his conviction over-
turned.107 The court noted that allowing the § 1983 suit to proceed
"would fly in the teeth of Heck"' 08 In Figuaeroa, the court rejected the
appellants' argument that refusing to allow the suit to proceed was
fundamentally unfair.
94 See ii at 165.
95 See id- at 167-68.
96 See i& at 168.
97 Id
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id,
101 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
102 IH at 484.
103 No. 99-5128, 1999 WNL 728353 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 1999) (per curiam).
104 I& at *1.
105 See i&
106 147 F.3d 77 (lst Cir. 1998).
107 See i& at 79.
108 I& at 81.
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[A]nnulment of the underlying conviction is an element of a sec-
tion 1983 'unconstitutional conviction' claim. Creating an equita-
ble exception to this tenet not only would fly in the teeth of Heck,
but also would contravene the settled rule that a section 1983 claim-
ant bears the burden of proving all the essential elements of her
cause of action. 10 9
The Figueroa panel observed that dicta from Spencer may "cast doubt"
on Heck's favorable-termination requirement but concluded that
"[t] he Court... has admonished the lower federal courts to follow its
directly applicable precedent, even if that precedent appears weak-
ened by pronouncements in [later] decisions, and to leave to the
Court 'the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.' We obey this
admonition."' 0
Whereas the Brown panel would allow a § 1983 suit to proceed so
long as the action taken did not alter the length of confinement, the
Sixth Circuit observed in Schillingv. White' that unless the action has
been reversed, "no § 1983 suit may exist."" 2 The Schilling court ar-
gued that the Heck opinion does not rest entirely on a desire to pre-
serve habeas corpus as the sole federal remedy for prisoners, but that
the principle applies with equal force to defendants who are no
longer incarcerated." 3 The Sixth Circuit refused to accept the con-
tention that Schilling was being denied a federal forum, stating in-
stead that Schilling "lacks a legitimate legal claim requiring
adjudication.""n 4
In a later, unpublished opinion, Bibbs v. Zummer,1 5 the Sixth Cir-
cuit briefly noted that, for the purposes of Heck and its progeny, the
"'conviction' in the prison disciplinary sense is the finding of guilt on
the disciplinary charge,"" 6 and if a successful § 1983 suit would imply
the invalidity of that finding, then Heck bars the action. 117
However, the Sixth Circuit clarified its position later in 1999
when it noted that a majority of the current Supreme Court Justices
appear to exclude from Heck's favorable-termination requirement
those individuals for whom habeas corpus is unavailable." 8 Despite
109 Id. (citations omitted).
110 Id. at 81 n.3 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)).
1 58 F.3d 1081 (6th Cir. 1995).
112 Id. at 1086.
113 See id. ("In fact, Heck applies as much to prisoners in custody (a habeas prerequi
site) as to persons no longer incarcerated.").
114 Id. at 1087.
115 No. 97-2112, 1999 WL 68573 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1999) (per curiam) (table opinion,
full text available on Westlaw).
116 Bibbs, 1999 WL 68573, at *3 n.6.
117 See id.
118 See Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 396 n.3 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 531 (1999) ("The majority of the Court in Spencer, however, now clearly excludes from
Heck's favorable termination requirement former prisoners no longer in custody.").
[Vol. 86:140
PRISONER .UTIGATION
this acknowledgment, the Circuit maintains that it will "continue to
follow Edwards and the reasoning of the unpublished Sixth Circuit
cases"1 9 until the Supreme Court decides to adopt a contrary
position.
The Seventh Circuit has given these issues heavier treatment than
most. In Anderson v. County of Montgomery,'20 the plaintiff was no
longer incarcerated, a fact that the court determined "has no bearing
on the applicability of Heck."' 2' The court explicitly agreed with the
Sixth Circuit's Schilling holding-that Heck applies as much to prison-
ers no longer in custody as to those who remain incarcerated-and
observed that the difficulty or impossibility of reversing or expunging
a conviction does not constitute a valid reason for bypassing Hed.122
In so holding, the panel refused to rely on Justice Souter's Heck con-
currence, noting that "a concurrence is not the law."'
When confronted with a plaintiff alleging due process violations
stemming from disciplinary segregation that did not involve the loss of
good-time credits, the Seventh Circuit again held Heck applicable.
The panel in Stone-Bey v. Ban zs'24 held that Heck applies to intraprison
disciplinary sanctions as well as to original criminal convictions. 12
The fact that Stone-Bey was only subjected to segregation without the
loss of good-time credits made no difference to the panel.12 6 Loss of
good-time credits or not, Stone-Bey was still attacking the judgment of
the hearing officer, a suit impermissible under Heck.127
However, after the Supreme Court's Spencer v. Kemna 28 decision,
the Seventh Circuit began backing away from the strong language of
Stone-Bey and Anderson. In the recent case of Carr v. O'Leay,'1 Chief
Judge Posner noted that the "dictum in Spencer v. Kemna casts suffi-
cient doubt on the applicability of Heck"1 30 to plaintiffs who are una-
119 Riley v. Kurtz, No. 98-1077, 1999 WL 801560, at *6 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 1999) (table
opinion, full text available on Westlaw).
120 111 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 1997), ovemded by DeWalt v. Carter, No. 98-2415, 2000 WL
1137385 (7th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000).
121 Id. at 499.
122 See id.
123 Id.
124 120 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 1997), ovemded by DeWalt v. Carter, No. 98-2415, 2000 WI
1137385 (7th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000).
125 See id at 721 ("Heck applies to 'judgments' rendered in the prison disciplinary
setting.").
126 See id
127 The court noted that, even if Stone-Bey were able to show a iolation of his due
process rights, he "would only be entitled to nominal damages for that violation because
any harm resulting from his placement in disciplinary segregation would not be compensa-
ble until his conviction on the disciplinary charge was invalidated by a state tribunal or by a
federal writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 722 n.3.
128 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
129 167 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1999).
130 Id. at 1127.
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ble to challenge the validity of their conviction.' 5 ' Judge Ripple, in a
separate concurrence, expressed frustration at the court's reluctance
to follow Justice Souter's "pragmatic limitation on the rule of Bal-
isoh."132 Judge Ripple maintained thatJustice Souter's view would pro-
vide a "common-sense ground"13 for decision and would allow the
court to decide the case in a "straightforward manner."13 4
In August of 2000, the Seventh Circuit overruled Stone-B6y and
Anderson in DeWalt v. Carter.35 In that case, the court squarely con-
fronted the issue of whether the Heck-Edwards rule precludes a § 1983
action when habeas is unavailable.'3 6 Explicitly adopting the Second
Circuit's Jenkins rationale, 3 7 the DeWalt panel refused to "rule in such
a way as would contravene the pronouncement of five sitting Jus-
tices." 138 Thus, the court held that "the unavailability of federal
habeas relief does not preclude a prisoner from bringing a § 1983 ac-
tion to challenge a condition of his confinement that results from a
prison disciplinary action." 13 9
Less hesitant than the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit has rec-
ognized an exception to Heck's favorable-termination rule. In Sheldon
v. Hundley,140 the court noted that "prisoners who challenge discipli-
nary rulings that do not lengthen their sentence are probably outside
the habeas statute and able to seek damages under § 1983 without
showing favorable termination in an authorized state tribunal or a fed-
eral habeas court."1 41 The case before the court, however, involved a
loss of good-time credits. As of yet, the court has had no occasion to
apply the reasoning of the Sheldon dicta.
The Ninth Circuit has also expressed doubt as to the continuing
validity of Heck's favorable-termination requirement, but it has de-
clined to follow the D.C. Circuit's lead. Rather, the court in Cabrera v.
City of Huntington Park142 simply noted that, despite the concurrences
in Heck, Edwards, and Spencer, "Heck remains good law."14
131 See id.
132 Id. at 1129 (Ripple, J., concurring in judgment).
133 Id at 1128 (Ripple, J., concurring in judgment).
134 Id- (Ripple, J., concurring in judgment).
135 No. 98-2415, 2000 WL 1137385 (7th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000).
136 See id- at *5.
137 Se id.
138 Id. at *8.
139 Id. at *9.
140 83 F.3d 231 (8th Cir. 1996).
141 Id. at 234.
142 159 F.3d 374 (9th Cir. 1998).
143 Id. at 380 n.6.
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B. The District Courts
The district courts are no less divided. Many courts have chosen
to acceptJustice Souter's "pragmatic limitation" on the applicability of
Heck and its progeny. One court, in fact, has characterized this posi-
tion as the "new majority." 44 The reasoning in these district court
opinions is fairly consistent: a tally of Supreme Court concurrences
and dissents reveals that, "in the eyes of a majority of the justices,
where federal habeas corpus is not available to address constitutional
wrongs, § 1983 must be."145 The math is simple: Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, and Blackmun joined Justice Souter's Heck concurrence;
Justice Blackmun retired, butJustices Breyer and GinsburgjoinedJus-
tice Souter's Spencer concurrence; finally, Justice Stevens expressed
support for Justice Souter's view in his Spencer dissent, bringing the
final total to five Justices (leaving behind ChiefJustice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas).
The list of district courts accepting this position is long. The
Northern District of Indiana indicated that there is "a lack of any clear
authority to the contrary,"146 and the Western District of Louisiana
opined that "[t]his result better accounts for the concern with funda-
mental fairness embodied in § 1983."147 The Central District of Cali-
fornia' 4s and at least two judges in the Southern District of New
York 149 agree. 50
Equally as long, however, is the list of district courts refusing to
accept such a position. ChiefJudge Larimer of the Western District of
New York read the Supreme Court cases as "sending a loud message:
144 Dolney v. Lahammer, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1042 n.1 (D.S.D. 1999).
145 Id at 1041.
146 Weller v. Grant County Sheriff, 75 F. Supp. 2d 927, 932 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
147 White v. Phillips, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1042 (W.D. La. 1998).
148 See Haddad v. California, 64 F. Supp. 2d 930, 938 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that the
court "will adhere to the reasoning ofJustice Souter's Spencer concurrence that a section
1983 claim is not barred under the rule of Heck unless the section 1983 plaintiff is in
custody").
149 See Green v. NewYork City Dep't of Correction, No. 98 CIV.825, 1999 WL 219911,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1999) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds that
claim did not involve the "factor duration" of the plaintiff's confinement); Sikvav. Sanford,
No. 91 CIV.1776, 1998 WL 205326, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1998) (noting that "if Edwards
were applicable to disciplinary confinement uithout good time loss cases, the Supreme
Court would have said so in Sandin"). But see Roucchio v. Coughlin, 29 F. Supp. 2d 72, 79
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (asserting that decisions like Silva "seem to conflict with the Supreme
Court's expansion of the applicability of common law principles announced in Heck").
Note, too, that Edwards was decided two years after Sandin.
150 See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1488-89 ("There is a district court opinion, however,
which says that [the language in Spencer] might be dicta, but five is more than four, and
since I agree with it anyway, I am going to fallow it."); see alsoYork v. Huerta-Garcia, 36 F.
Supp. 2d 1231, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (arguing that extension of the favorable-termination
rule to disciplinary sanctions which do not involve the loss of good-time credits "misses the
mark and paines Heck's holding with far too broad a brush").
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an inmate cannot seek money damages for alleged deprivations aris-
ing out of a prison disciplinary hearing by commencing an action
under § 1983 unless the results of that hearing already have been in-
validated."' 51 The court remarked that "[t]he rationale for the Su-
preme Court's message is clear: it would make little sense for an
inmate to recover damages for something that occurred during a
hearing, the validity of which remains untested or unchallenged"1 52 by
appeal, administrative review, collateral attack, or habeas corpus.' 53
Chief Judge Larimer is not alone. In the Southern District of
New York, Judge Mukasey, in Jenkins v. Haubert (later vacated by the
Second Circuit), refused to read the holding of Edwards as limited to
loss of good-time credits. 54 Judges Chin, 155 Baer, 15 6 Sotomayor, 15 7
Preska,158 and Haight 59 agreed.
III
JENKINS V. HAUBERT1 6 0
A. Facts
Plaintiff-appellant Eric Jenkins, while incarcerated at Green Ila-
ven Correctional Facility, was subject to the first of two disciplinary
hearings on July 26, 1994.161 Defendant-appellee, Lieutenant Michael
Haubert of the New York State Department of Corrections, who pre-
sided over the hearing, refused Jenkins's request to call four wit-
nesses.' 6 2 Following the proceedings, Haubert foundJenkins guilty of
151 Burnell v. Coughlin, 975 F. Supp. 473, 477 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
152 Id.
153 See id.
154 SeeJenkins v. Haubert, No. 95 CIV. 5453, 1998 WL 148332, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,
1998) (noting that the Court was "not saying that a plaintiff must exhaust state remedies
before filing a § 1983 claim, but that 'while the state challenges are being pursued,... the
§ 1983 claim has not yet arisen'" (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 515 U.S. 477, 489 (1994))),
vacated, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999).
155 See Odom v. Coombe, No. 95 CIV. 6378, 1998 WL 120361 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1998),
abrogated by Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999).
156 See Scott v. Scully, No. 93 CIV. 8777, 1997 WL 539951 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1997),
abrogated by Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999).
157 See Higgins v. Coombe, No. 95 CIV. 8696, 1997 WL 328623 (S.D.N.Y. June 16,
1997), abrogated byJenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999).
158 See Sims v. Artuz, No. 96 CIV. 0216, 1997 WL 527882 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1997),
abrogated byJenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999).
159 See Gomez v. Kaplan, No. 94 CIV. 3292, 1998 WL 355427 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1998),
abrogated byJenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999).
160 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999).
161 SeeJenkins v. Haubert, No. 95 CIV. 5453, 1998 WL 148332, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,
1998), vacated, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999).
162 See id.
[Vol. 86:140
2000] PRISONER ITIGATION 157
violating prison rules and sentenced him to thirty days in keeplock.'6
Jenkins properly but unsuccessfully filed an administrative appeal with
the Green Haven Correctional Facility superintendent.Y"
On August 14, 1994,Jenkins filed a C.P.L.R- Article 78'C claim in
New York Supreme Court, alleging that Haubert's refusal to hear
from witnesses violated due process. 166 While the Article 78 claim was
pending, Jenkins was the subject of another disciplinary hearing. 67
Jenkins requested a substitute for Haubert in order to avoid possible
prejudice against him stemming from the Article 78 proceeding, in
which Jenkins named Haubert as a defendant.16 Haubert denied the
request, found Jenkins guilty of the charges, and sentenced him to
another thirty days in keeplock.169 Once again, Jenkins unsuccessfully
appealed to the superintendent 1 70
After the NewYork Supreme Court dismissed his Article 78 claim,
Jenkins filed suit under § 1983 in the Southern District of New York,
alleging that Haubert had violated his Fourteenth Amendment right
to procedural due process when he refused to allow the four wit-
nesses' testimony during the first hearing.171 Jenkins also alleged that
Haubert had denied him due process at the second hearing, because
the "defendant was biased against him, and retaliated against him for
having initiated the Article 78 proceeding." 172
The district court dismissedJenkins's claims in two separate opin-
ions.173 In the first opinion, Judge Mukasey ruled that Jenkins was
collaterally estopped from relitigating the claims raised in the Article
78 proceeding. 174 In the second opinion, the court held that Jen-
kins's § 1983 suit arising out of the second hearing was not cognizable
under the rule of Heck and Edwards.'75 Jenkins appealed the second
opinion.
163 SeeJenkins 179 F.3d at 20-21 (noting that "kecplock" is "a form of segregation in
which the inmate is confined to his cell, deprived of participation in normal prison rou-
tine, and denied contact with other imnates." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
164 See Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 21.
165 Article 78 provides: "Relief previously obtained by writs of certiorari to reviet, man-
damus or prohibition shall be obtained in a proceeding under this article...." N.Y.
C.P.LR. § 7801 (McKinney 1994).
166 See Jenkins, 179 F.3d. at 21.
167 See id
168 See i&L
169 See i&i
170 See U,
171 See id
172 Jenkins v. Haubert, No. 95 CIV. 5453, 1998 IIL. 148332 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,
1998), vacated, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999).
173 See Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 21.
174 Se U
175 See id
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B. The Second Circuit
Writing for the panel, Judge Walker characterized the issue in
Jenkins as "whether Heck and Edwards bar a § 1983 claim... where a
prisoner (or former prisoner) alleges a constitutional violation arising
out of the imposition of intra-prison disciplinary sanctions that have
no effect on the duration of the prisoner's overall confinement[,] ...
an open question in our circuit."176
After exploring § 1983 and the habeas corpus statute, the court
turned to Supreme Court precedent. The court noted that, until re-
cently, the favorable-termination requirement of Heck "generated con-
fusion in the lower courts, especially with respect to the question of
whether an intra-prison disciplinary sanction that does not affect the
length of a prisoner's overall confinement constitutes a 'conviction or
sentence' within the meaning of the Heck rule."' 7 The court ob-
served that much of the confusion stemmed from Edwards, in which a
ruling in the prisoner's favor would necessarily invalidate the revoca-
tion of his good-time credits. 178
After discussing Spencer v. Kemna,179 the court opined that Su-
preme Court precedent does not require application of the Heck rule
to a § 1983 suit challenging a disciplinary segregation term that does
not include good-time credit loss. °80 A contrary position would "con-
travene the pronouncement of five justices that some federal rem-
edy-either federal habeas corpus or § 1983-must be available."18 '
Accordingly, the court adopted the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Brown
v. Plaut,182 expressed doubt at the continuing validity of Stone-Bey v.
Barnes,'83 and read its own holding in Black v. CoughlinI8 4 as encom-
passing only challenges to the fact or length of a prisoner's confine-
ment when federal habeas corpus is available.' 8 5
While the Jenkins court held that Heck and its progeny did not bar
Jenkins's § 1983 claim, the court remanded the case for consideration
176 Id.
177 Id. at 25.
178 See id.
179 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
180 Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 27.
181 Id.
182 131 F.3d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denie, 524 U.S. 939 (1998); see supra notes 93-
102 and accompanying text.
183 120 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 1997), overruled by DeWalt v. Carter, No. 98-2415, 2000 WL
1137385 (7th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000); see supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
184 76 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1996). There, the Second Circuit saw "no reason why Reck,
which dealt with constitutional challenges to a criminal conviction, is not also controlling
with respect to due process challenges to prison disciplinary hearings." Id. at 75, see infra
notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
185 See Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 28.
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of whether, under the requirements of Sandin v. Conner,186 Jenkins
had stated a legally cognizable claim of deprivation of due process.18 7
IV
ANALYsIs OF JENKMNS AND THm HEcK RULE
The Second Circuit's analysis in Jenkins leads to two conclusions.
The first conclusion is that, in light of dicta in Spencer v. Kemna,18s
§ 1983 must be available to those prisoners who are outside the reach
of habeas corpus (whether because they were fined or because their
term of imprisonment is complete). The second conclusion is that,
since Jenkins attacked only his placement in disciplinary segregation
(which had no effect on the overall length of confinement), Heck and
its progeny do not bar a § 1983 suit.
In remanding the case for Sandin consideration, the court col-
lapsed analytically distinct due process claims, reflecting the continu-
ing uncertainty in the lower courts as to how to properly resolve this
"confusing thicket " 18 9
A. The Heck Rule's Applicability to Prisoners No Longer in
Custody
A significant portion offenkins focuses on Spencer v. Kemna,190 cul-
minating in the conclusion that since five Justices have expressed
doubt as to Heck's applicability to prisoners no longer in custody,
"some federal remedy.., must be available."' 91 While Jenkins did not
treat it as such, the issue is a threshold one, in that if the Heck line of
cases does not apply to former prisoners, then the analysis is over. Any
discussion of length and condition of confinement are superfluous if
Justice Souter's position prevails, at least insofar as Heck and Edwards
are concerned.
Following the "new majority position," the Jenkins court does the
math, comes up with a majority of the Court, and adopts it as law.
However, the court is quick to note that its holding does not rest
solely "on our tally of votes on the Court for Justice Souter's view of
Heck."' 92 The remainder of the opinion suggests quite the opposite.
186 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
187 See Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 29.
188 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
189 Koehn, supra note 16, at 92; see Bradley v. Evans, No. 98-5861, 2000 WL 1277229, at
*5 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2000) (table opinion, full text available on Westlaw) ("A guiding hand
from the Supreme Court, however, seems very much in order to prevent future courts
from losing their way in this forest of uncertainty.").
190 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
191 Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 27.
192 Id.
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Once one poses the threshold question, there are but two possi-
ble answers: either Heck and its progeny apply to plaintiffs no longer
in custody or they do not. If the answer is the former, then the analysis
shifts to whether Heck applies to disciplinary segregation unrelated to
the length of confinement. If the answer is the latter, then the Heck
analysis ends and Sandin analysis begins.
Jenkins defies this logic by erroneously answering the threshold
question in the negative and proceeding with the disciplinary segrega-
tion query. Thus, even though the court refused to accept the pro-
position that "the principle barring collateral attacks . . . is not
rendered inapplicable by the fortuity that a criminal is no longer in-
carcerated," 193 its analysis proceeds as though it had.194
At oral argument, the Jenkins panel requested that the parties sub-
mit letter briefs addressing the impact of Spencer on the issues
presented on appeal. Jenkins's attorney contended: "Mr. Jenkins, like
the claimant in Spencer, is an individual without recourse to habeas to
whom the favorable-termination requirement should not apply." 95
The court agreed with that contention, despite the fact that the Spen-
cer plurality opinion rebuffed a similar argument as "a great non se-
quitur, unless one believes (as we do not) that a § 1983 action for
damages must always and everywhere be available." 19 6 According to
Jenkins, application of the favorable-termination bar to Jenkins would
result in an "untoward result,"197 namely the denial of a federal forum
for claiming a deprivation of federal rights.'98
This "new majority" position represents a misreading of not only
Heck and Edwards, but also of the Spencer plurality opinion. 99 In fact,
the Spencer plurality noted that "[i]t is not certain .. .that a § 1983
damages claim would be foreclosed"200 if a former prisoner were to
challenge only the procedures used without necessarily implying the
result's invalidity.201 Thus, Spencer reinforces Heck's admonition that
"the principle barring collateral attacks.., is not rendered inapplica-
ble by the fortuity that a convicted criminal is no longer incarcer-
193 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 n.10 (1994).
194 SeeJenkins, 179 F.3d at 27-28.
195 Letter Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 3, Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir.
1999) (No. 98-2408).
196 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998).
197 Heck, 512 U.S. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
198 See id. (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
199 Cf RIcHARD H. FALLON ET AL.., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 'ME
FEDERAL SMsTEM 194 (4th ed. Supp. 1999) ("Justice Souter's position in Heck now appears to
command a majority.").
200 Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17.
201 See id.
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ated,"202 while clarifying that former prisoners may bring suits that do
not imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed.203
Justice Souter's position seems to rest on the general principle
that litigants alleging constitutional violations must be afforded a fed-
eral remedy. The authority for the "principle that every person assert-
ing a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to
litigate that right in a federal district court... is difficult to discern. It
cannot lie in the Constitution.... [a]nd no such authority is to be
found in § 1983 itself."20 4 In Withrow v. Williams,205 Justice Scalia
noted that "[iut would be a strange constitution that regards state
courts as second-rate instruments for the vindication of federal rights
and yet makes no mandatory provision for lower federal courts."20 r6
Thankfully, resolution of this difficult question is not at issue, be-
cause whether or not a plaintiff is currently in custody has no effect on
the applicability of Heck and its progeny.207 While the lack of habeas
availability "strikes a responsive cord,"203 the "core holding"209 of Heck
is still applicable. 210 Prisoners challenging the validity of the punish-
ment imposed must obtain ajudgment invalidating it before a "§ 1983
suit may exist."2 11 This favorable-termination requirement does not,
as Justice Souter contends, deny a federal remedy to prisoners for
whom habeas is no longer available. Rather, it mandates that, for a
legitimate legal claim to exist under § 1983, the plaintiff has two op-
tions: (1) she must bring a § 1983 suit challenging only the proce-
dures used and not the result reached, or (2) she must first have the
punishment invalidated by a nonfederal tribunal.
While the second option seems to compel an unfair result, the
alternative would result in perverse incentives. The State argued in its
Jenkins letter brief that a narrow reading of Edwards "would permit an
inmate to revive expired claims upon release from prison and reward
inmates for failing to pursue diligently state-based remedies, as re-
202 He4k 512 U.S. at 490 n.10.
203 See id2
204 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980).
205 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
206 Id. at 723 (Scalia, J., concurring).
207 See Anderson v. County of Montgomery, 111 F.d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting
that plaintiff's no longer being incarcerated "has no bearing on the applicability of Hedi),
ovde7Td by DeWalt v. Carter, No. 98-2415, 2000 WL 1137385 (7th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000). But
see supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
208 Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1998).
209 Id.
210 Cf Beermann, supra note 49, at 720 (arguing that "one clear exception that should
be made from Heck's rule is that a convict who cannot seek habeas corpus should be al-
lowed to bring a damages action challenging his conviction").
211 Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995).
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quired by Heck and Edwards."21 2 Thus, a prisoner would be able to
sidestep the favorable-termination requirement simply by waiting out
her sentence.
The Second Circuit's reliance on counting up the votes of con-
currences is misplaced. Aside from succumbing to the dubious prac-
tice of relying on the dicta from concurring and dissenting
opinions,213 Jenkins failed to recognize that Heck, Edwards, and Spencer
apply regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is incarcerated. Be-
cause § 1983 provides for suits alleging "deprivation of any rights...
secured by the Constitution,"214 "there has been no injury of constitu-
tional proportions,"215 unless the plaintiff, whether in custody or not,
can show that the punishment has been reversed.216
B. The Heck Rule's Applicability to Disciplinary Segregation
Even though the Jenkins court refused to accept the proposition
that Heck's favorable-termination rule applies to individuals for whom
habeas is not available, it nonetheless proceeded to discuss the rule's
applicability to suits challenging disciplinary segregation that do not
affect the overall length of confinement. In refusing to apply the Heck
rule to suits attacking disciplinary segregation, the Second Circuit
joins those of its sister circuits who have erroneously circumvented the
favorable-termination requirement.
In his brief to the court, Jenkins argued that "Edwards is not
meant to reach § 1983 actions like the present, which challenge only
the conditions of the prisoner's confinement rather than its fact or
duration."217 Lieutenant Haubert claimed that such an argument "re-
flects an untenably narrow reading of that case." 218 The court agreed
with Jenkins and characterized his suit as "a challenge to the condi-
tions of his confinement, rather than as a challenge to the fact or
duration of his confinement."219 Accordingly, the court found that
Heck's favorable-termination requirement did not apply.220
212 Letter Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 3, Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir.
1999) (No. 98-2408).
213 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 217 (1997) (cautioning that "statements made
by five Justices... do not, in themselves, furnish a basis for concluding that our...
jurisprudence has changed"); Randell v. Johnson, No. 99-11092, 2000 WL 1280459, at *1
(5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2000) ("[W]e decline to announce for the Supreme Court that it has
overruled one of its decisions.").
214 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
215 Schilling, 58 F.3d at 1086.
216 See id.
217 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999)
(No. 98-2408).
218 Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 6, Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999)
(No. 98-2408).
219 Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 27.
220 See id.
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The State had argued that the Second Circuit recently "applied
the Heck rule to a conditions of confinement case where federal
habeas corpus was unavailable" 221 in Black v. Coughlin.-=2 The argu-
ment is compelling. The plaintiff in Black alleged that procedural de-
fects at a disciplinary hearing resulted in a sentence of 180 days in
confinement.223 A good-time credit loss was not involved, and the
confinement therefore had no effect on the overall length of his
prison term.2 4 The Black court saw "no reason why Heck, which dealt
with constitutional challenges to a criminal conviction, is not also con-
trolling with respect to due process challenges to prison disciplinary
hearings."225 The Jenkins court, however, "decline[d] to read Black
that way."226
The Second Circuit's interpretation is consistent with the D.C.
Circuit's conclusion that the Supreme Court, in Sandin v. Conner,-"
did not question the plaintiff's invocation of § 1983 in an administra-
tive segregation suit.22 8 While this is true, it is certainly not disposi-
tive. One should note that the Edwards decision came two years after
Sandin and that the Edwards Court concluded that a suit implying the
"invalidity of the punishment imposed ... is not cognizable under
§ 1983."22 The "punishment imposed" on a plaintiff such asJenkins
is the keeplock confinement itself, regardless of its effect on the over-
all prison sentence.
Scholars have recently noted that the tendency of some lower
courts to read Heck and Edwards as "mandat[ing] dismissal even of
§ 1983 challenges to prison conditions or proceedings that are unre-
lated to possible early release"2 0 is a "dubious application" of those
cases.23' These scholars, like the Jenkins court, point to the Stone-Bqe= 2
case as an example, especially given the recent pronouncements of
Justice Souter in Heck2 3 and Spencer.34
However, a closer reading of those lower court opinions reveals
that the application of Heck and Edwards to these situations is perhaps
221 Id. at 28.
222 76 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1996).
223 See id. at 73.
224 See id.
225 Id. at 75.
226 Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 28.
227 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
228 See Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997), car. denied, 524 U.S. 939 (1998).
229 Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (emphasis added).
230 FAuoN Er AL.., supra note 199, at 195.
231 Id.
232 Stone-Bey v. Barnes, 120 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 1997), overrued by DeWak v. Carter, No.
98-2415, 2000 WL 1137385 (7th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000).
233 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 491-503 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
234 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1998) (Souter, J., concurring).
20001
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
not so dubious after all; 23 5 the logic in those opinions is, in fact, per-
suasive. Roy Heck sought damages in federal court for a state court
conviction that no tribunal had overturned.236 Similarly, Jerry Balisok
sought damages for an intraprison disciplinary hearing that resulted
in the loss of good-time credit.2 37 In both instances, the Supreme
Court emphasized that allowing the § 1983 suits to continue before
invalidation of the conviction "'would permit a collateral attack on
the conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit."' 23 8
The Court's reasoning applies with equal force to disciplinary
segregation, in which case the "conviction" is "the finding of guilt on
the disciplinary charge. '239 As the Seventh Circuit noted in Stone-Bey,
whether the sentence imposed is coupled with loss of good time cred-
its or whether it simply consists of disciplinary segregation makes no
difference in applying Heck and its progeny.240 The Court's concern
in Heck and Edwards was the "hoary principle" that civil actions are
inappropriate vehicles for launching collateral attacks on criminal
proceedings that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the punish-
ment imposed.241 This concern is as real for disciplinary segregation
that results in good-time credit loss as for segregation that does not.
C. A Better Approach
Having concluded that the favorable-termination requirement
applies neither to former prisoners nor to challenges to disciplinary
segregation that have no effect on the duration of the prisoner's over-
all confinement, the Jenkins court remanded the case for determina-
tion of whetherJenkins stated a claim cognizable under Sandin.2 42 In
doing so, the court failed to recognize two analytically distinct due
process claims, the first of which implies the invalidity of the confine-
ment and is therefore barred by Heck and its progeny. The second
challenges only the procedures used without necessarily implying the
confinement's invalidity, thereby providing a proper basis for a § 1983
claim.
235 See Schwartz & Pratt, supra note 4, at 325 (noting Judge Pratt's response to Profes-
sor Schwartz's opinion that Edwards imposed an exhaustion requirement: "[i]f you have
not got the disciplinary sanction vacated, nothing wrong has been done to you that the
federal court or Section 1983 is interested in correcting").
236 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 478-79.
237 See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997).
238 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484 (quoting 8 S. SPEISER ET AL., AtERcAN LkW OF ToRTs
§ 28:5, at 24 (1991)).
239 Bibbs v. Zummer, No. 97-2112, 1999 WL 68573, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1999) (per
curiam) (table opinion, full text available on Westlaw).
240 See Stone-Bey v. Barnes, 120 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 1997), overruled by DeWalt v.
Carter, No. 98-2415, 2000 WL 1137385 (7th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000).
241 Heck, 512 U.S. at 486.
242 See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
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In order to recover compensatory damages under § 1983, a plain-
tiff must prove "actual injury caused by the denial of his constitutional
rights."243 Constitutional rights, however, "do not exist in a vac-
uum."244 Insofar as Jenkins alleged that Lieutenant Haubert's bias re-
sulted in a violation of his constitutional rights, his claim alleged
actual injury--wrongful finding of guilt on the charges-and "neces-
sarily impl[ied] the invalidity" of the punishment imposed. In Hek,
Edwards, and Spencer, the Court noted that § 1983 claims will not be
foreclosed when the suits challenge only the procedures used.2 43
However, these suits are valid causes of action only when the procedu-
ral challenge does not imply the punishment's invalidity. The Edwards
Court unanimously held that procedural defects "based on allegations
of deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker,"2 46 similar to
those thatJenkins alleged, are not cognizable under § 1983 until the
plaintiff obtains favorable termination.2 47
Prisoners may properly seek damages under § 1983 without first
obtaining favorable-termination only if the alleged injury "does not en-
compass the 'injury' of being convicted and imprisoned (until his con-
viction has been overturned). "248 The prisoner may seek "nominal
damages for ... a violation of his right to procedural due process. "2 49
When a § 1983 suit does not allege that the procedures used in a disci-
plinary hearing caused the actual injury of wrongfil conviction and
confinement, nominal damages are available. Nominal damages "are
the appropriate means of 'vindicating' rights whose deprivation has
not caused actual, provable injury."2 °
One may certainly argue that denying Jenkins's right to call cer-
tain witnesses violated his right to due process. Insofar as the com-
plaint alleged a violation of that right without implying the invalidity
of the officer's final determination, Jenkins was entitled to go forward
with his § 1983 suit.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Heck is less than six years old, and its use
of the favorable-termination requirement in Edwards and Spencer took
place within the last three. Within this relatively short period of time,
243 Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986).
244 Id. at 307-08 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978)).
245 See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17 (1998); Edmards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997);
Heck, 512 U.S. at 482-83.
246 Edwards 520 U.S. at 648.
247 See id.
248 Hedk 512 U.S. at 487 n.7.
249 Id. at 499 n.4 (SouterJ., concurring injudgment) (citing Care), v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 266 (1978)).
250 Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n.11 (1986).
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the lower courts have become deeply divided as to proper application
of the Heck rule. The Second Circuit's 1999 decision in Jenkins reflects
this division. Nevertheless, the Jenkins opinion is most interesting not
for the position it eventually takes or for the circuits with which it
sides, but for the manner in which it arrives at its conclusion. The
reasoning of Jenkins is noteworthy not so much as an illustration of the
division of the lower courts, but as an illustration of the confusion
over how this complicated line of cases fits together.
The Supreme Court's rationale in Heck was relatively straightfor-
ward: it would be improper for a prisoner to use a civil damages action
to circumvent the habeas statute's strict requirements. The real diffi-
culty began after the Court made the jump in Edwards, extending the
favorable-termination rule to disciplinary sanctions that revoked good-
time credits. While Edwards was a unanimous opinion, the holding's
breadth remains unclear. The four separate opinions in Spencer v.
Kemna certainly did not help clean up the mess.
Until the Supreme Court provides a more clearly defined rule,
the lower courts should read the Heck-Edwards-Spencer line of cases as
standing for the following general proposition: In order to recover
damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, imprisonment,
or intraprison confinement, § 1983 plaintiffs-including those persons
no longer in custody-must first prove that the conviction, sentence,
or punishment has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by execu-
tive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issu-
ance of a writ of habeas corpus. A contrary rule, such as the one that
the Second Circuit adopted in Jenkins, reflects an overly narrow read-
ing of this line of cases and should be rejected.
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